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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4471 
___________ 
 
BRENDA LEE SENEY, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-12-cv-01706) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 2, 2014 
Before:  HARDIMAN, NYGAARD and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 26, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Brenda Lee Seney, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the 
order of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware denying her motion 
for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of 
Social Security (“Commissioner”).  In its decision, the District Court determined that 
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substantial evidence supported the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of 
Seney’s application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and 
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”).  We will affirm for substantially the same 
reasons set forth in the District Court’s opinion. 
I. 
 In June 2009, Seney applied for DIB and SSI.  Seney alleged that she was disabled 
due to symptoms associated with multiple sclerosis (“MS”), which began in October 
2007 when she was 35 years old.  After the diagnosis, Seney began therapy and 
treatment.  Prior to the onset of the alleged disability, Seney, a high school graduate, held 
a variety jobs including as a warehouse worker, fast food worker, and a cleaner.  The ALJ 
held a hearing, during which documentary evidence of Seney’s health was presented.  
Seney, her spouse, and a vocational expert testified at the hearing.
1
   
 In her decision, the ALJ performed the five-step, sequential analysis for 
determining whether a claimant is disabled.  See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); 
see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25 (2003).  The ALJ determined: (1) Seney 
was not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date; (2) Seney had 
severe impairments; (3) Seney did not have an impairment or combination of 
impairments that was the same or equivalent to an impairment listed by the Social 
Security Administration as presumptively precluding any gainful activity; (4) Seney was 
                                              
1
 The District Court fully summarized the evidence and testimony presented during the 
hearing in its opinion.  See Seney v. Colvin, 982 F. Supp. 2d 345, 348-53 (D. Del.  2013). 
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unable to perform her past relevant work; and (5) Seney possessed sufficient residual 
functional capacity to perform other available jobs in the national economy.  
Consequently, the ALJ concluded that Seney was not disabled from October 2007 
through the date of the decision.   
 The Appeals Council denied Seney’s request to review the ALJ’s decision, making 
that decision the final decision of the Commissioner.  In December 2012, Seney filed an 
action in the District Court seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision denying her 
claim for DIB and SSI.  The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the 
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner.  Seney timely 
appealed. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the ALJ’s legal conclusions and review the factual findings for substantial evidence.  
Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011).  Substantial 
evidence is “‘more than a mere scintilla,’” and is defined as “‘such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate.’”  Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (quoting Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995)).  If the ALJ’s 
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings, 
even if we would have decided the factual inquiry differently.  Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 
F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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III. 
 Seney first argues that the ALJ did not sufficiently credit the opinions of her 
treating physicians.  While an ALJ must generally give great weight to a claimant’s 
treating physician, an ALJ may discredit the treating physician’s opinion if other 
evidence contradicts it.  20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c); Morales v. Apfel, 225 
F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361.  Here, it was 
appropriate for the ALJ to discredit portions of the opinions of Seney’s treating 
physicians.  In particular, Dr. Lee Dresser’s opinion that Seney could stand or walk for 
only less than two hours in an eight-hour day and was incapable of low stress jobs, was 
not supported by objective medical evidence.  Evidence showed that Seney’s MS had 
improved with treatment and that she was free from various symptoms, including 
weakness, numbness, and balance problems.  Dr. Dresser’s own notes from treatment 
indicated a fair prognosis, observing that Seney had near-normal strength in her lower 
extremities and a stable gait.  The ALJ fully credited Dr. Dresser’s opinion that Seney 
could sit for six hours in an eight-hour day because the medical evidence supported that 
opinion.   
 Dr. Fucci’s opinion, presented in the form of a written prescription, stated that 
Seney had MS, that her condition was worsening, and that she would need to be out of 
work.  This opinion was also appropriately discredited.  Principally, there were no 
medical records or notes of treatment indicating how Dr. Fucci had arrived at his opinion, 
and it was contrary to the evidence showing that Seney was responding positively to 
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treatment.  Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the 
opinions of Dr. Dresser and Dr. Fucci were not wholly substantiated.  
 Next, Seney argues that the ALJ did not sufficiently credit her subjective 
complaints of disabling symptoms.  In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the 
Commissioner considers “all . . . symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which 
[these] symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with objective medical 
evidence . . . .”  20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a).  When evaluating subjective 
complaints of disabling symptoms, the ALJ must assess the persistence and intensity of 
the claimant’s pain as well as the extent to which it impairs her ability to work.  20 C.F.R. 
§§ 404.1529(c)(1), 416.929(c)(1).  Allegations of disabling symptoms must be consistent 
with objective medical evidence, and the ALJ must explain why any allegations were 
rejected.  See Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 The ALJ first determined that Seney had a medical impairment that could 
reasonably be expected to produce pain and other symptoms.  However, during the 
second step of the inquiry, the ALJ determined that Seney could perform a range of 
sedentary work despite her symptoms.  In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ considered 
the treatment needed for Seney’s condition, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(v), 
416.929(c)(3)(v); the positive results from that treatment, the medication that she was 
taking, and its side effects, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(iv), 416.929(c)(3)(iv); her 
ability to perform many daily functions, including managing her own personal care, 
cooking, childcare, cleaning, and shopping, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i), 
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416.929(c)(3)(i); and the opinions of three state agency physicians who concluded that 
she had a range of limitations on her ability to work but that she could ultimately perform 
sedentary work.  See Hartranft, 181 F.3d at 362.  Consequently, the ALJ’s decision to not 
credit Seney’s allegations of disabling pain and other symptoms is supported by 
substantial evidence. 
 Seney also argues that the ALJ did not properly consider the vocational expert’s 
testimony.  In particular, Seney contends that the ALJ’s conclusion was contrary to the 
vocational expert’s response to a hypothetical question.  ALJs routinely pose hypothetical 
questions to vocational experts in order to determine a claimant’s ability to perform 
alternative employment.  See Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 205-06 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  “‘While the ALJ may proffer a variety of assumptions to the expert, the 
vocational expert’s testimony concerning a claimant’s ability to perform alternative 
employment may only be considered for purposes of determining disability if the 
question accurately portrays the claimant’s individual physical and mental impairments.’”  
Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 123 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Podedworny v. Harris, 745 
F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984)).  The ALJ asked the vocational expert two hypothetical 
questions.  The first hypothetical question did not include all of Seney’s allegations of 
disabling symptoms and posited that the individual could stand and walk in excess of two 
hours in an eight-hour workday and that she could sit for six hours in a workday.  In 
response to that question, the vocational expert concluded that the hypothetical individual 
could perform alternative work.  The second hypothetical question included all of 
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Seney’s allegations of disabling symptoms.  In that case, the vocational expert responded 
that the individual could not perform alternative work.  While Seney contends that the 
ALJ should credit the vocational expert’s response to the second hypothetical, the ALJ 
properly did not rely on that response because it included allegations of disabling 
symptoms that, for the reasons discussed above, were not credibly established.  Cf. 
Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1276 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 Seney alleges that her condition has worsened since her hearing.  However, those 
new allegations are immaterial to the ALJ’s determination that Seney was not disabled 
from October 2007 until the time of her hearing, and we are unable to review them.  Cf. 
Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592-93 (3d Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court that the 
ALJ’s determination is supported by substantial evidence. 
